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This paper analyzes how a tax/subsidy policy a⁄ects consumers￿behavior when choosing
between green (pollution free goods) and conventional products, and its e⁄ects on welfare when
a proportion of consumers have strong preferences for green goods. We analyze a Hotelling￿ s
linear city model where ￿nal products by two ￿rms are symmetric in all dimensions except for the
externality their production process generates. Our e¢ ciency comparisons suggest that under
a setting of horizontal product di⁄erentiation an environmental regulation (either on polluting
￿rms or consumers buying their products) yields higher social welfare than the absence of policy.
Moreover, the proportion of consumers who prefer green products a⁄ects the welfare gains from
a subsidy or tax policy.
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11 Introduction
Environmentally friendly products, also referred to as ￿green￿products, are goods and services con-
sidered to in￿ ict minimal or no harm on the environment, such as nontoxic detergents, mercury-free
batteries, hybrid cars and clean energy. This paper analyzes settings where ￿rms produce homo-
geneous goods whose environmental properties di⁄er. Speci￿cally, we study the case in which the
production of a homogeneous product by a ￿green￿industry is less harmful to the environment
than that from a ￿brown￿industry. Some ￿rms usually generate low emissions during their pro-
duction process.1 Organic food, for instance, is produced using agricultural techniques that do not
require synthetic inputs such as pesticides and chemical fertilizers. A study developed by Cook et
al. (2007) analyzes the greenhouse gas impacts of speci￿c farming techniques. They ￿nd that the
cultivation process of organic food, such as potatoes, apples and asparagus, generates considerably
less CO2 emissions than conventional farming methods.2
A green product is an impure public good in our setting, through which public goods can be
provided privately (Cornes and Sandler, 1996; Kotchen, 2006). We consider that consumers who
favor green products experience an additional bene￿t from their purchase decision. In particular,
they are concerned about how the production process potentially a⁄ects the environment and
bene￿t not only from using the good but also from its environmental characteristics.3 Our paper
hence studies how a tax/subsidy policy can promote the consumption of green products in a context
of horizontal product di⁄erentiation. In addition, we investigate the welfare consequences of this
policy.
The paper develops a two-stage complete information game. In the ￿rst stage, the government
decides an optimal policy (tax or subsidy) that maximizes social welfare. The second stage rep-
resents the horizontal product di⁄erentiation where ￿rms compete in prices. A ￿rm￿ s location in
our model measures the degree of emissions produced by these ￿rms. We consider the case where
two ￿rms produce either brown or green goods. These two products provide the same base utility
when they are consumed. The production process of a brown good harms the environment, whereas
green products do not damage the environment, i.e. they are pollution-free goods. Moreover, we
assume that consumers are not homogeneous, that is, they have di⁄erent preferences for green and
brown products and their ultimate purchasing decision is a⁄ected by price and traveling costs. The
government in our model maximizes the social welfare which explicitly considers the environmental
damage generated by the ￿rm producing a brown good. The two di⁄erent policies analyzed in this
paper in￿ uence prices by modifying ￿rms￿marginal cost and thus in￿ uence consumers￿behavior.
1The list of companies that have taken steps to reduce carbon emissions includes I.B.M., Nike, Coca-Cola and BP.
Google, Yahoo and Dell are among the companies that have vowed to become ￿carbon neutral.￿(See the New York
Times, January 21st, 2009)
2They determine, for instance, that the total emissions for cultivating a 0.5 pound organic potato in Prosser, WA
are 3 grams of CO2 equivalent whereas those from the conventional potato are 10 grams.
3Nevertheless, as shown by Eriksson (2004) and Rodriguez-Ibeas (2007) such consumers￿environmental idealism
is not enough to lead to signi￿cant reductions in pollution. They also suggest that environmental policies should be
considered to mitigate global pollution.
2In our study we aim to answer the following questions: (1) What is the optimal environmental
policy when consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for green products?, and (2) How is
such policy a⁄ected by a change in the proportion of green consumers?
We show that when products are di⁄erentiated in their environmental properties a tax/subsidy
policy increases social welfare. Speci￿cally, our e¢ ciency comparisons suggest that under a set-
ting of horizontal product di⁄erentiation a tax/subsidy (either on consumers or polluting ￿rms)
produces a larger social welfare than no policy. Moreover, the proportion of consumers who prefer
green products also a⁄ects the welfare gains from imposing a tax or subsidy policy. Hence, our set-
ting suggests that the promotion of environmental awareness among consumers can reduce the need
of regulation, avoiding the costs associated with its implementation. Some studies have previously
analyzed government￿ s in￿ uence on market behavior. Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) study the
e⁄ects of both uniform policies on ￿rms and regulations that discriminate between ￿rms based on
their environmental quality in the presence of environmentally aware consumers. They ￿nd that
uniform and discriminatory subsidies reduce total pollution and enhance aggregate welfare, while
taxes have the opposite properties. Cremer and Thisse (1999) analyze a vertical di⁄erentiation
model considering ￿rms￿entry behavior. They show that a commodity tax may have a signi￿cant
impact on the market structure and it may be welfare-improving. Unlike this literature, which
considers vertical product di⁄erentiation, our paper examines a setting of horizontal product di⁄er-
entiation where goods are homogeneous. As a consequence, this study provides a simpli￿ed way to
analyze the impact of a policy on social welfare when consumers are asymmetric in their concerns
about the pollution a good emits. In addition, our model does not need to consider that quality and
environmental properties are related, unlike the previous literature. The ￿nal products generated
by two ￿rms are homogeneous in all dimensions, except for the externality (emissions) generated
during their production process.
In addition to tax/subsidy policies, other policy instruments have also been discussed in the
literature, such as emission standards or emission permits. For instance, similar to Cremer and
Thisse (1999), Moraga-Gonzalez and Padro-Fumero (2002) consider a model where ￿rms￿demand
is exogenous. They show that, despite the existence of an emission standard, industrial aggregate
emissions can still be increased and social welfare reduced as a consequence of the standard. Sim-
ilarly, Parry et al. (1999) assessed the welfare e⁄ects of a revenue-neutral carbon tax and carbon
emission permits, they take into account pre-existing tax distortions in factor markets. They found
that a carbon tax performs better than emissions permits and it is welfare improving under a larger
set of parameter values. These studies, however, have analyzed environmental regulation under a
setting of vertical product di⁄erentiation.
The structure of the paper is as follows, section 2 describes the model, section 3 analyzes an
unregulated market, section 4 analyzes the implementation of a tax and subsidy policies, describing
their welfare consequences, and section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
32 Model
Assume two types of consumers, green (G) and neutral (N). Green consumers account for ￿
proportion of the population while the proportion of neutral buyers is 1 ￿ ￿, where ￿ 2 (0;1).
Similar to the linear city model of horizontal product di⁄erentiation, we represent the length of the
city from zero to one. Consumers are uniformly located along this segment and their location is
denoted by x 2 (0;1), which represents the distance from the left end of the city. Assume that the
total amount of consumers is M > 0. In addition, there are two ￿rms located at each end of the
city, ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2, producing a green product and a brown product, respectively. Firm 1 is at
the left end and ￿rm 2 at the right. Consider green and brown products being similar except for
their environmental impact. For instance, if both ￿rms produce detergent, all consumers obtain
the same utility from using this product. However, the production of detergent by ￿rm 1 does not
contaminate the environment while the production process of ￿rm 2 is not environmentally friendly
and generates an environmental damage. We also assume that each consumer buys one unit of the
good. Consumers￿utility from buying the product of the pollution-free ￿rm (￿rm 1) is
ui =
(
v ￿ p1 ￿ rx + g if i = G
v ￿ p1 ￿ rx if i = N
while their utility from purchasing ￿rm 2￿ s product is
ui = v ￿ p2 ￿ r(1 ￿ x) for all i = fG;Ng
Hence, when consumer i is green (i = G) she obtains a utility v from consuming a green or
brown product and an additional utility4 g if this good is produced by ￿rm 1. In addition, p1 and
p2 denote the price of a green and a brown product, respectively, where both prices are strictly
positive. The cost or disutility per x unit of distance traveled by the consumer when buying either
product is r 2 R+. Intuitively, r captures the disutility that consumers experience when buying a
green (x = 0) or a brown good (x = 1) that di⁄ers from their ideal preference for environmental
features in the product. The neutral buyer (i = N) only obtains a utility v from both types of
goods. In particular, this type of buyer does not experience an additional utility from a good
produced using clean technology. Firm 1 and 2 have the following pro￿t functions,
￿1 = (p1 ￿ c1)(Q1G(p1;p2) + Q1N(p1;p2))
￿2 = (p2 ￿ c2)(Q2G(p1;p2) + Q2N(p1;p2))
where Qji represents ￿rm j￿ s demand function from buyer i and cj represents ￿rm j￿ s marginal cost,
where j = f1;2g and i = fG;Ng. Assume linear cost functions and marginal costs satisfy c1 > c2,
intuitively ￿rm 1 incurs a higher cost from the reduction of emissions while ￿rm 2￿ s abatement
4Consumer￿ s asymmetric concerns can be explained because green consumers are more aware about the negative
e⁄ects of pollution on the environment.
4e⁄orts are zero.5 In our model ￿xed costs are equal to zero.
In addition, the government seeks to implement an environmental policy, either a tax, t, or
subsidy, s, which induces the consumption of an environmentally friendly product. The optimal
policy maximizes the following social welfare function,
SW = CS + PS + Gov ￿ Env
where CS is the consumer surplus including green and neutral buyers, PS represents the producer
surplus considering pro￿ts from ￿rms 1 and 2, Env is the environmental damage produced by ￿rm
2 and Gov denotes the government revenue (expenditure) from the tax (subsidy, respectively). We
consider that the production of one unit of the brown good generates one unit of emission, hence,
Env = d ￿ (Q2G(p1;p2) + Q2N(p1;p2)) where d represents the marginal environmental damage.
The time structure of the game is as follows: First, the government implements an environmental
policy (either a tax or subsidy) that maximizes social welfare; and then ￿rms simultaneously and
independently set pro￿t-maximizing prices.
3 Unregulated market
In the case where the government does not implement an environmental policy, our model is reduced
to a one stage game in which ￿rms compete in prices. First, let us analyze the demand function
that ￿rm 1 and 2 face. Note that a green consumer is indi⁄erent between buying a green or a brown
product when
v ￿ p1 ￿ rx + g = v ￿ p2 ￿ r(1 ￿ x)
Therefore, the distance x that makes green buyers indi⁄erent between consuming a green or brown
product is b x1 =
p2￿p1+g+r
2r . Similarly, the indi⁄erence point for neutral buyers solves v ￿p1 ￿rx =
v￿p2￿r(1￿x), i.e., b x2 =
p2￿p1+r
2r . Lemma 1 describes the demand from both types of consumers.





0 if p1> p2+g + r
p2￿p1+g+r
2r ￿￿M if p2+g ￿ r ￿ p1￿ p2+g + r





0 if p1> p2+r
￿p1+p2+r
2r ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ M if p2￿r ￿ p1￿ p2+r
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ M if p1< p2￿r
for green and neutral consumers, respectively. Similarly, and ￿rm 2￿ s demand is






0 if p2> p1+r ￿ g
p1￿p2+r￿g
2r ￿￿M if p1￿g ￿ r ￿ p2￿ p1+r ￿ g





0 if p2> p1+r
p1￿p2+r
2r ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ M if p1￿r ￿ p2￿ p1+r
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ M if p2< p1￿r
The above lemma describes buyer￿ s behavior for di⁄erent ranges of prices. Notice that a green
buyer does not consume ￿rm 1￿ s product if the di⁄erence in prices does not compensate the addi-
tional utility she obtains from consuming an environmentally friendly good (net of the travel cost,
r). Similarly, the neutral consumer buys a green product (from ￿rm 1) if the price of the brown
good exceeds the price of the green product, after considering the travel cost.
Firms identify their best response given the price charged by the other ￿rm. That is, ￿rm 1
has to decide its optimal price given its rival￿ s strategy. Let us restrict our analysis to interior
solutions,6 where p1 2 [p2 + g ￿ r;p2 + r] and p2 2 [p1 ￿ r;p1 + r ￿ g]. In order to guarantee that
p2 +g ￿r < p2 +r and p1 ￿r < p1 +r ￿g, then g 2 (r;2r). The shaded areas in Figure 1 describe







Figure 1: Interior solutions.
6When the brown product is not bought by green or neutral consumers, i.e., Q2G(p1;p2) = Q2N(p1;p2) = 0, the
demand of the green product becomes Q1G(p1;p2) = ￿M from green consumers and Q1N(p1;p2) = (1 ￿ ￿)M from
neutral consumers. For these demands to arise in this corner solution, we need p1 < p2 ￿ r (or r < p2 ￿ p1) to hold.
Intuitively, this implies that the price of the brown good is su¢ ciently higher than that of the green good (relative to
travel costs) to induce all types of customers to only buy the green good. Importantly, note that condition r < p2￿p1
does not depend on g, the additional utility that green consumers derive from buying from ￿rm 1, thereby reducing
the analysis to a standard horizontal di⁄erentiation model. Therefore, we hereafter focus on interior solutions.
6Therefore, ￿rms j￿ s maximization problem is,
max
pj
￿j = (pj ￿ cj)(QjG(pj;pk) + QjN(pj;pk)) (1)
where j 6= k. Therefore, optimal prices and ￿rms￿equilibrium pro￿ts are,
p￿
1 =













M(3r + c1 ￿ c2 ￿ g￿)2
18r
(3)
Prices and pro￿ts of both types of ￿rms are a⁄ected by the proportion of consumers, ￿, who
value the environmental bene￿ts from green products. Notice that ￿rms 1￿ s pro￿ts (￿rm 2￿ s)
increase (decrease) with the proportion of consumers who value environmental products (larger ￿)
and with the additional bene￿ts associated to green products, i.e., yield a larger g. Additionally,
as expected, we also ￿nd that the travel cost positively a⁄ects ￿rms￿pro￿ts. Finally, using (2) and
(3) we obtain equilibrium output levels,
Q￿
1G =









3r ￿ c1 + c2 ￿ 2g￿
6r
(1 ￿ ￿)M and Q￿
2N =
3r + c1 ￿ c2 + 2g￿
6r
(1 ￿ ￿)M (5)
The demand for green products is positively related with the utility that the consumer derives
from protecting the environment, g. This result suggests that, for a given population, an increase on
consumers￿awareness for conservation of the environment positively a⁄ects the demand for goods
produced by environmentally friendly ￿rms. We next discuss our results when the government
imposes a tax or a subsidy policy.
4 Tax and subsidy policy
4.1 Tax on the production of polluting goods
We now analyze the case where the government decides to promote the consumption of green
products by setting an emission fee t on ￿rm 2￿ s production. Let us use the Lemma 1. However,
the ￿rm￿ s maximization problem is di⁄erent, since ￿rm 2 not only incurs a cost c2 from producing




￿2 = (p2 ￿ c2 ￿ t)(Q2G + Q2N) (6)
The optimal prices when a given tax t is set by the government are identi￿ed in lemma 2.
7Lemma 2. The optimal prices of ￿rm 1 and 2 in the second stage of the game where the
government sets a tax t are, respectively,
p￿
1t =





3r + c1 + 2c2 ￿ g￿ + 2t
3
. (8)
Higher taxes increase the price charged by both ￿rms. Note that when the proportion of
consumers who prefers green products is close to zero (￿ = 0), then the tax can potentially induce
the consumption of environmentally friendly products. In fact, if the tax o⁄sets the di⁄erence in
marginal costs, c1 ￿c2, the good produced by ￿rm 1 becomes cheaper than the brown product. In
addition, ￿rm 2￿ s pro￿ts are a⁄ected by t. In particular, the policy favors ￿rm 1￿ s pro￿ts, increasing
them by an amount equal to the tax. The following proposition describes the regulator￿ s choice of
optimal taxes at the ￿rst stage of the game, and below we elaborate on its intuition and comparative
statics.
Proposition 1. In the two stage complete information game, the optimal tax on ￿rm 2 is
t￿ = (2g￿ + 3d) ￿ 2(c1 ￿ c2)
In particular the optimal tax increases in the environmental damage, d, and in consumers￿
bene￿t from the green product, g. In order to revert the environmental damage, the government
sets a higher tax which induces the consumption of environmentally friendly products. In addition,
the tax is decreasing in ￿rm 1￿ s cost disadvantage, c1 ￿c2. Intuitively, when both ￿rms are equally
e¢ cient in the production of green and brown products, the tax only internalizes the negative e⁄ect
of pollution and the utility bene￿ts from the green product. In contrast, when the production of
the green ￿rm is more costly, c1 > c2, the tax becomes less stringent.
4.2 Tax on the consumption of polluting goods
We next investigate the case where the tax is imposed on consumers of brown products. Since the
tax is now paid by consumers, their utility functions are as follows,
ui =
(
v ￿ p1 ￿ rx + g if i = G
v ￿ p1 ￿ rx if i = N
when they consume a green product and their utility from purchasing ￿rm 2￿ s product is
ui = v ￿ p2 ￿ r(1 ￿ x) ￿ e t for all i = fG;Ng
Note that both types of consumers pay a tax e t when buying a good produced by ￿rm 2.
Therefore, the demand for both ￿rms is substantially di⁄erent from those presented in Lemma 1.
In the presence of a tax e t on brown purchases, the distance x that makes green buyers indi⁄erent
8between consuming a green or brown product is that solving v￿p1 ￿rx+g = v￿p2 ￿r(1￿x)￿e t,
i.e., e x1 =
p2￿p1+g+r+e t
2r . Similarly, the indi⁄erence point for neutral buyers is e x2 =
p2￿p1+r+e t
2r .





0 if p1> p2+g + r+~ t
p2￿p1+g+r+~ t
2r ￿￿M if p2+g ￿ r + ~ t ￿ p1￿ p2+g + r+~ t





0 if p1> p2+r+~ t
￿p1+p2+r+~ t
2r ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ M if p2￿r + ~ t ￿ p1￿ p2+r+~ t
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ M if p1< p2￿r+~ t





0 if p2> p1+r ￿ g￿~ t
p1￿p2+r￿g￿~ t
2r ￿￿M if p1￿g ￿ r ￿ ~ t ￿ p2￿ p1+r ￿ g￿~ t





0 if p2> p1+r￿~ t
p1￿p2+r￿~ t
2r ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ M if p1￿r ￿ ~ t ￿ p2￿ p1+r￿~ t
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ M if p2< p1￿r￿~ t
When the regulator sets a tax on consumers buying brown goods, relative prices are a⁄ected,
ultimately promoting the consumption of green products. More neutral buyers are induced to
consume green products as their relative price, after considering taxes and traveling costs, decrease.
In addition, more green buyers choose green products since brown goods become more expensive
with the tax. The following proposition speci￿es the optimal tax set on consumers.
Proposition 2. In the two stage complete information game, the optimal tax on the consumers
of the brown product is e t￿ = t￿.
Note that the optimal tax described in Proposition 2 coincides with that identi￿ed in Proposition
1. This tax ensures that those consumers who are indi⁄erent between buying green and brown goods
decide to purchase the environmental product given the extra cost imposed by a tax e t. Note that
when the proportion of consumers preferring green goods increases, the tax increases and consumers
become more heavily penalized when buying a brown product. Intuitively, the negative externality
produced by ￿rm 2 is mainly internalized by the neutral buyers who decide to consume a polluting
good (brown product).
94.3 Subsidy on the consumption of green goods
We next analyze the implementation of a subsidy, s. In this setting, both types of consumers receive
the subsidy s when buying a good produced by ￿rm 1. Therefore, in the presence of a subsidy,
the distance x that makes green buyers indi⁄erent between consuming a green or brown product
is now represented by x1 =
p2￿p1+g+r+s
2r . Similarly, the indi⁄erence point for neutral buyers is
x2 =
p2￿p1+r+s
2r . Let us now examine the optimal subsidy resulting from the maximization of social
welfare.
Proposition 3. In the two stage complete information game, the optimal subsidy to consumers
for their purchases of green products is s￿ = t￿.
Hence, a subsidy policy that makes the green product relatively cheaper is equivalent to a tax
that makes the brown product more expensive. Most importantly, the environmental policies ex-
amined in the paper yield the same social welfare. In a context of complete information, Weitzman
(1974) discusses that price and quantity controls produce the same outcomes. Our paper hence
shows that di⁄erent environmental regulations achieve similar results also in contexts of horizon-
tal di⁄erentiation, and demonstrates that environmental policy is welfare improving even in the
presence of consumers with heterogeneous concerns about the environment. We next analyze the
welfare comparison between the di⁄erent environmental policies.
Corollary 1. The social welfare when an optimal emission fee t￿ is imposed on the polluting
company (or a tax e t￿ is set on the consumer buying polluting goods), or an optimal subsidy s￿
is provided to the ￿rm producing the environmentally friendly good (or the consumer buying its
product), is strictly larger than that arising when the regulator is absent, i.e., t = 0 and s = 0.
Hence, Corollary 1 implies that if two products are only di⁄erentiated in their environmental
properties (i.e. in terms of emissions levels), the tax/subsidy policy increases the social welfare since
it induces a higher proportion of neutral consumers to buy from ￿rm 1, ultimately reducing the
environmental damage. This result highlights the welfare-maximizing advantages of a tax/subsidy
policy when consumers are asymmetric in their environmental preferences, and suggests that the
implementation of environmental policies are indeed relevant when consumers are not homogeneous.
The mere existence of a group of green buyers does not adequately address the negative externality
produced by ￿rm 2, while the implementation of environmental policies achieves higher social
welfare. In addition, our model speci￿es that the increase in social welfare resulting from the
environmental policy decreases with the proportion of green consumers, making environmental
regulation less necessary. Finally, note that di⁄erent weights on consumer and producer surplus
can potentially a⁄ect the stringency of the environmental policy. For instance, if the regulator
assigns more weight on consumer than producer surplus, the tax (subsidy) would become less
stringent (more generous, respectively), leading to an increase in the quantity produced. However,
the equilibrium social welfare induced by both policy instruments would coincide given that the
regulator is perfectly informed about the industry characteristics.
105 Conclusions
This paper studies a Hotelling￿ s linear city model in order to analyze how di⁄erent policies a⁄ect
consumers￿behavior when choosing between green (pollution-free goods) and conventional brown
products. Speci￿cally, we study the e⁄ects of a pollution tax and a subsidy on welfare. Firms￿
demand is endogenous in our linear product di⁄erentiation model. Consumers are divided into two
di⁄erent groups, those who favor environmentally friendly production process and those who do
not care about the protection of the environment. We show that, when products are di⁄erentiated
in their environmental properties, the introduction of a tax/subsidy policy increases social welfare.
In addition, the proportion of green buyers and the environmental damage induce more stringent
policies. However, despite the consumers￿preferences, when a green good is too costly to produce, it
maybe unpro￿table to promote its consumption, and as a consequence the tax/subsidy is relatively
small or nonexistent.
From a policy perspective, when consumers di⁄erently value the environmental properties of a
product and, in addition, goods are identical except for their negative e⁄ects on the environment,
a tax/subsidy policy increases welfare. However, this policy is speci￿cally targeting the group of
consumers (or ￿rms) who do not assign any value to the environmental protection. Hence, the
promotion of environmental awareness among consumers can potentially eliminate the role of the
tax/subsidy policy and the costs bear from its implementation. In other words, the higher the
proportion of consumers who obtain an additional bene￿t from green products, the lower the need
of this type of environmental policy. Sartzetakis et al. (2009) show that consumers￿preferences
changing over time through education can improve social welfare. Further research is nonetheless
necessary to analyze the complementarities between policies that increase consumers￿awareness for
the environment and tax/subsidy policies.
116 Appendix
6.1 General case
Let us identify the social welfare when no environmental policy (either tax or subsidy) is implemented by
the government. The social welfare is de￿ned as follows,
SW = CS + PS ￿ Env
where the consumer surplus is composed by green (G) and neutral (N) buyers, CS = CSG + CSN. In
addition, green buyers choose between goods produced by ￿rm 1 and 2. Hence, CSG = CS1G +CS2G and
CSN = CS1N + CS2N. Finally, consumer surplus can be written as,






(v ￿ p1 ￿ rx + g)dx +
1 Z
b x1











(v ￿ p1 ￿ rx)dx +
1 Z
b x2











and the environmental damage is denoted by Env = d ￿ (Q2G(p1;p2) + Q2N(p1;p2)), where d represent
the magnitude of environmental damage and
Q￿
2G =




3r + c1 ￿ c2 + 2g￿
6r
(1 ￿ ￿)M










First, note that the tax is imposed on ￿rm 2. Hence, ￿rm 1￿ s and 2￿ s demand are identical to those in




￿1 = (p1 ￿ c1)(Q1G(p1;p2) + Q1N(p1;p2)
and ￿rm 2 ,
12max
p2
￿2= (p2￿c2 ￿ t)(Q2G(p1;p2) + Q2N(p1;p2))
Hence, optimal prices and ￿rms￿pro￿ts are,
p￿
1t =




3r + c1 + 2c2 ￿ g￿ + 2t
3
The demand of green consumers is,
Q￿
1G =





3r + c1 ￿ c2 + 2g￿ ￿ 3g ￿ t
6r
￿ ￿M
and the neutral buyer￿ s demand is
Q￿
1N =
3r ￿ c1 + c2 ￿ 2g￿ + t
6r
￿ M ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Q￿
2N =
3r + c1 ￿ c2 + 2g￿ ￿ t
6r
￿ M ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Substituting optimal prices and demand for green and brown products we obtain ￿rms￿pro￿ts,
￿￿
1(t) =




M(3r + c1 ￿ c2 ￿ g￿ ￿ t)2
18r
Finally, in the ￿rst stage of the game the government sets the optimal tax,
max
t
SW(t) = CS(t) + PS(t) + Tax ￿ Env(t)






(￿4c1 + 4c2 + 4g￿ + 6d ￿ t)
and solving the ￿rst order conditions (F.O.C) with respect to t we obtain the optimal tax,
t￿ = (2g￿ + 3d) ￿ 2(c1 ￿ c2)





((2g￿ + 3d) ￿ 2(c1 ￿ c2))2
136.3 Proposition 2
First, in lemma 3 we identify the demand functions. Note that the tax, ~ t, is imposed on consumers of the
good produced by ￿rm 2. In the second stage of the game ￿rms compete ￿ la Bertrand. Hence,￿rm 1 solves
the same maximization problem than in Proposition 1 and ￿rm 2 solves,
max
p2
￿2= (p2￿c2)(Q2G(p1;p2) + Q2N(p1;p2))
Therefore, optimal prices and ￿rms￿pro￿ts are,
p￿
1~ t =




3r + c1 + 2c2 ￿ g￿ ￿ ~ t
3
Hence, the demand of green consumers is,
Q￿
1G =





3r + c1 ￿ c2 + 2g￿ ￿ 3g ￿ ~ t
6r
￿ ￿M
and the neutral buyer￿ s demand is
Q￿
1N =
3r ￿ c1 + c2 ￿ 2g￿ + ~ t
6r
￿ M ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Q￿
2N =
3r + c1 ￿ c2 + 2g￿ ￿ ~ t
6r
￿ M ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Substituting optimal prices and demand for green and brown products we obtain ￿rms￿pro￿ts,
￿￿
1(~ t) =




M(3r + c1 ￿ c2 ￿ g￿ ￿ ~ t)2
18r
Finally, in the ￿rst stage of the game the government sets the optimal tax,
max
~ t
SW(~ t) = CS(~ t) + PS(~ t) + Tax ￿ Env(~ t)
therefore the social welfare is,
max
~ t
SW(~ t) = SWGC+
~ tM
36r
(36r ￿ 4c1 + 4c2 + 4g￿ + 6d ￿ ~ t)
and solving the F.O.C with respect to ~ t we obtain the optimal tax,
e t￿ = (2g￿ + 3d) ￿ 2(c1 ￿ c2)





((2g￿ + 3d) ￿ 2(c1 ￿ c2))2
6.4 Proposition 3
In the presence of a subsidy to consumers buying green goods, the distance x that makes green buyers
indi⁄erent between consuming a green or brown product is now represented by x1 =
p2￿p1+g+r+s
2r . Similarly,
the indi⁄erent point for neutral buyers is x2 =
p2￿p1+r+s
2r In the second stage of the game ￿rms compete in
Bertrand. Hence, each ￿rm solves the same maximization problem than in Proposition 2, but now considering
the subsidy on consumers. Therefore, optimal prices and ￿rms￿pro￿ts are,
p￿
1s =




3r + c1 + 2c2 ￿ g￿ ￿ s
3
Hence, the demand of green consumers is,
Q￿
1G =





3r + c1 ￿ c2 + 2g￿ ￿ 3g ￿ s
6r
￿ ￿M
and the neutral buyer￿ s demand is
Q￿
1N =
3r ￿ c1 + c2 ￿ 2g￿ + s
6r
￿ M ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Q￿
2N =
3r + c1 ￿ c2 + 2g￿ ￿ s
6r
￿ M ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Substituting optimal prices and demand for green and brown products we obtain ￿rms￿pro￿ts,
￿￿
1(s) =




M(3r + c1 ￿ c2 ￿ g￿ ￿ s)2
18r
Finally, in the ￿rst stage of the game the government sets the optimal subsidy,
max
s SW(s) = CS(s) + PS(s) ￿ Subsidy ￿ Env(s)





(￿4c1 + 4c2 + 4g￿ + 6d ￿ s)
15and solving the F.O.C with respect to s we obtain the optimal subsidy,
s￿ = (2g￿ + 3d) ￿ 2(c1 ￿ c2)





((2g￿ + 3d) ￿ 2(c1 ￿ c2))2
We next compare social welfare when no policy is in place versus the case where the consumer of a green












((2g￿ + 3d) ￿ 2(c1 ￿ c2))
2 > 0 for all values of c1;c2;g;￿;d;M and r
6.5 Corollary 1
Welfare comparison. Note that the social welfare obtained in the general case, SWGC, is always a









(￿2c1 + 2c2 + 2g￿ + 3d)2 > SWGC
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